Crime, security and defence
Security and defence since 2021
What the UK kept, lost or replaced in police data sharing, extradition and defence cooperation with the EU since the end of 2020. Published figures are few here, so this page is largely a tracker of arrangements, with the numbers shown where they are published.
Extradition
Surrenders to and from the UK, 2009 to 2021
Surrenders from the UK to EU states were 452 in 2021, against 1,431 in 2016 and 563 in 2020. Surrenders to the UK from EU states were 156 in 2021; the highest year in the series was 2019, with 234.
- Surrendered from the UK to EU states (EAW / TCA "wanted from the UK", Part 1). Solid ink line.
- Surrendered to the UK from EU states (wanted by the UK, Part 3). Dashed line.
- Shaded: Covid years 2020 and 2021.
- End of 2020: the UK left the EAW on 31 December 2020 (SIS II access ended the same day); from 1 January 2021 the TCA surrender system applied.
Calendar years. Counts of people surrendered, from the National Crime Agency's audited totals. Source:NCA, EAW-TACA statistics, wanted from the UK andwanted by the UK; vintage 2021, fetched 6 November 2026.
Values by year
| Year | Surrendered from the UK | Surrendered to the UK |
|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 537 | 76 |
| 2010 | 1,038 | 133 |
| 2011 | 1,079 | 136 |
| 2012 | 1,025 | 136 |
| 2013 | 1,126 | 127 |
| 2014 | 1,097 | 145 |
| 2015 | 1,149 | 123 |
| 2016 | 1,431 | 156 |
| 2017 | 1,164 | 174 |
| 2018 | 873 | 185 |
| 2019 | 781 | 234 |
| 2020 | 563 | 179 |
| 2021 | 452 | 156 |
Read these figures with care
- Requests, arrests and surrenders do not track the same people in the same year. A person arrested in one year may be surrendered in the next.
- The 2020-21 NCA figures include both EAW and TCA cases. Covid cut arrests and travel in 2020 and 2021, so those years are shaded.
- From 2021, incoming requests refer to Interpol circulations where they once referred to SIS II Article 26 alerts (NCA note). The measure changed at the same point the chart's switch line marks.
- The NCA's country tables for some years do not add up to its audited totals. The chart uses the audited totals. Differences found this build: calendar 2018: surrenders country table sums to 190, audited total is 185; calendar 2020: surrenders country table sums to 51, audited total is 179; calendar 2017: arrests country table sums to 199, audited total is 198; calendar 2018: arrests country table sums to 229, audited total is 219; calendar 2020: arrests country table sums to 51, audited total is 220.
- Financial-year figures are also published by the NCA and are kept in the data file; the chart uses calendar years.
- The NCA's historical series for 2004 to 2015 is published as a web page of totals, not a spreadsheet, and is not charted here.
Police and counter-terrorism data
Data sharing: what the UK kept, lost or replaced
One row per system. Each row says how far the claim was checked. Checks were made in November 2026 (latest check 6 November 2026). Where a check could not be completed, the row says so.
| System | What it does | UK position since 2021 | Check |
|---|---|---|---|
| SIS II (Schengen Information System) | Real-time alerts on wanted and missing people and objects, shared between Schengen states. | Lost on 31 December 2020. The TCA does not mention the Schengen Information System. Its Title IV (Article 563) lets police and other authorities request or volunteer information on wanted and missing persons and objects, and Title VII (Articles 596 to 632) keeps a surrender system. Incoming extradition requests now refer to Interpol circulations (plus direct communication from Ireland) instead of SIS II Article 26 alerts. | Checked against an official text
|
| Prüm | Automated matching of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data between states. | Retained under the TCA (Part Three, Title II, Articles 527 to 541). The Agreement sets up automated searching of DNA profiles (Articles 530 and 531), fingerprint data (Article 534) and vehicle registration data (Article 537). Data could be supplied to the UK only after an EU evaluation (Article 540), with an interim period of up to nine months, extendable once by nine. The EU can suspend the Title if EU law changes substantially (Article 541). Whether the evaluation has been completed is not stated in the Agreement and was not checked. | Checked against an official text |
| Passenger Name Records (PNR) | Airline passenger booking and travel data, used to screen travel between the EU and UK. | Retained (Part Three, Title III, Articles 542 to 562). Air carriers on flights between the EU and UK may transfer PNR data to the UK competent authority (Article 545). The UK may not keep PNR data for more than five years, must mask data that identifies passengers within six months, and must delete the data of passengers after they leave unless a risk assessment shows a need to keep it (Article 552). Specific cases such as investigations and prosecutions are exempt until concluded (Article 552(8)). | Checked against an official text |
| Criminal records exchange (ECRIS) | Exchange of previous convictions between EU states, through central authorities. | Continues under the TCA (Part Three, Title IX, Articles 643 to 651), in a different form from EU membership. Each side designates central authorities (Article 645). They notify each other of convictions of the other's nationals at least once a month (Article 646(2)), store them (Article 647) and answer requests as soon as possible and within 20 working days (Article 649(1)). Exchange is electronic, using the ECRIS reference implementation software or national ECRIS software over the TESTA network (Article 650; Annex 44, Articles 2 and 3). The Title provides for requests and replies between central authorities; it contains no provision for direct or real-time access to another state's records. | Checked against an official text
|
| Europol and Eurojust | EU police and prosecution agencies (information exchange, case coordination). | The UK is no longer a member of either agency. The TCA sets up cooperation: Title V (Articles 564 to 579) on Europol, through a UK national contact point and liaison officers (Article 568), and Title VI (Articles 580 to 595) on Eurojust, through a contact point and a UK Liaison Prosecutor with up to five assistants (Articles 584 and 585). Neither Title creates an obligation beyond the agency's own competence (Articles 579 and 595), and neither gives the UK membership or access to the agencies' own databases. | Checked against an official text |
Debated questions
How far the loss of SIS II matters
People who work in policing and the government read the same evidence differently. Both positions are set out here; this page does not settle the question.
The capability-gap argument
Some police and border witnesses, and the Lords EU Security and Justice Sub-Committee's report on policing after Brexit, described the loss of SIS II as a gap in capability. The committee heard that Interpol alerts are not automated, must be uploaded by hand, and carry no power of arrest, and that the UK depends on EU states also using Interpol to share alerts.
Lords debate, 11 March 2022, on Beyond Brexit: policing, law enforcement and security (secondary coverage of the report; the committee's own text was not checked here).
The government and NCA position
The National Police Chiefs' Council lead said there was not thought to be a "significant loss of capability", that there may be "some risks", and that the two systems overlap, so there was no "huge data loss". The government and the NCA say alternatives, including Interpol channels and extra intelligence officers, have kept the capability.
Sources: Police Professional, post-Brexit crime intelligence (secondary coverage); the NCA letter summary cited in the planning brief could not be checked.
What the record does not show
Committee evidence records that neither the NCA nor ministers had given figures comparing the number of Interpol alerts entered for wanted people with the number of SIS II alerts. The data on this page cannot show whether alerts are being missed, and it does not measure outcomes.
Defence
Defence spending, context only
Defence spending as a share of GDP for all 28 countries, 2025. The 23 EU members of NATO and the UK are shown on NATO's measure (a 2025 estimate); Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are not NATO members and are shown on SIPRI's measure. The list is in alphabetical order and is not ranked: higher spending is not neutrally better, and a percentage of GDP says nothing about what the money buys.
| Country | Defence spending, % of GDP (2025) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | 1.10% | SIPRI |
| Belgium | 2.00% | NATO |
| Bulgaria | 2.13% | NATO |
| Croatia | 2.07% | NATO |
| Cyprus | 1.61% | SIPRI |
| Czechia | 1.86% | NATO |
| Denmark | 3.27% | NATO |
| Estonia | 3.93% | NATO |
| Finland | 2.75% | NATO |
| France | 2.04% | NATO |
| Germany | 2.22% | NATO |
| Greece | 2.79% | NATO |
| Hungary | 2.06% | NATO |
| Ireland | 0.22% | SIPRI |
| Italy | 2.09% | NATO |
| Latvia | 3.67% | NATO |
| Lithuania | 4.03% | NATO |
| Luxembourg | 2.01% | NATO |
| Malta | 0.45% | SIPRI |
| Netherlands | 2.53% | NATO |
| Poland | 4.25% | NATO |
| Portugal | 2.01% | NATO |
| Romania | 2.19% | NATO |
| Slovakia | 2.03% | NATO |
| Slovenia | 1.57% | NATO |
| Spain | 2.00% | NATO |
| Sweden | 2.85% | NATO |
| United KingdomUK | 2.32% | NATO |
Sources: NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2026), Table 3(Excel workbook) andSIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1949-2025 (v1.2). Rows marked NATO use NATO's 2025 estimate of core defence expenditure as a share of GDP (2021 prices); rows marked SIPRI use SIPRI's 2025 military expenditure. The two measure spending slightly differently (NATO and SIPRI use different definitions of what counts, and NATO's 2025 figure is an estimate), so the two groups are not strictly comparable. Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are not NATO members, so SIPRI is the only source for them.
Timeline
UK and EU defence arrangements since 2025
19 May 2025
First UK-EU summit: Security and Defence Partnership
Leaders in London adopted a Security and Defence Partnership alongside a joint statement and a common understanding on a renewed agenda. The partnership may allow UK participation in selected EU defence programmes, 'such as the proposed SAFE initiative', where mutually agreed.
- EEAS, EU and UK conclude a Security and Defence Partnership checked 6 November 2026
28 November 2025
Talks on UK access to SAFE end without agreement
The UK government said on 28 November 2025 that talks on UK participation in the first round of SAFE, the EU's defence loans instrument of EUR 150bn, had ended without agreement. Under SAFE, at least 65% of the component costs of a funded product must originate in the EU, Ukraine or eligible EEA-EFTA countries, so up to 35% can come from elsewhere, including the UK. UK firms can still bid on those standard third-country terms.
The date and the entry-fee dispute are from press reports (AP, Reuters, Bloomberg); the outcome is confirmed by the UK written statement of 1 December 2025 (next entry). Reported fee figures differ between outlets (EUR 4bn to 6.75bn) and are not stated on the page. The 35% rule is in Regulation (EU) 2025/1106, Article 16(10); the Commission's SAFE page states the 65% floor.
- European Commission, SAFE: Security Action for Europe (65% component-cost origin rule; EUR 150bn) checked 6 November 2026
- AP via WTOP, talks on UK access to an EU defense fund have broken down checked 6 November 2026
1 December 2025
UK government statement on SAFE
In a written ministerial statement on UK-EU relations, the UK government said it was disappointing that discussions on UK participation in the first round of SAFE had not been positively concluded, and that the UK's defence industry continues to have access to SAFE under standard third-country terms. It said it would keep working in good faith on the wider package agreed at the May 2025 summit.
Statement HCWS1114 (Commons) and HLWS1112 (Lords), 1 December 2025. The Parliament page returned 403 to the fetch tool here, so the wording is taken from search-result extracts of that page, not read in full. This replaces the earlier entry 'Reported: UK says it will not join SAFE', which rested on a Chatham House page that could not be opened; the statement says the first-round talks were not concluded, not that the UK would never join.
- UK Parliament, Written statement: UK-EU relations, 1 December 2025 (HCWS1114) checked 6 November 2026
1 February 2026
Reported: prime minister says UK would consider a second SAFE round
On 1 February 2026 the prime minister was reported as saying the UK would consider applying to a possible second round of SAFE, if one is launched and terms can be agreed that benefit UK defence industry. The European Commission was reported to be considering a second edition.
Press reports only (Reuters via Arab News; Bloomberg); no gov.uk or No 10 transcript was found. A second round has not been confirmed (see the 2 November 2026 entry).
2 November 2026
EU-UK security and defence dialogue: no result on SAFE
After an EU-UK security and defence dialogue in Brussels on 2 November 2026, the EU High Representative said there was no result on UK participation in SAFE, that the current SAFE is already working, and that a possible follow-up, 'SAFE two', is under discussion but its conditions are not settled. She said she wanted progress on a Framework Participation Agreement for UK participation in EU missions, still under negotiation.
From the EEAS record of the joint doorstep with the UK Secretary of State for Defence. A UK-EU summit was reported as scheduled for 20 November 2026; it had not taken place by 6 November 2026 and is not listed as an event.
Context
Where most European defence cooperation happens
Most European defence cooperation runs through NATO. Brexit did not change that: the UK remained a NATO member throughout. EU instruments such as SAFE are one part of the picture, not all of it.
What this page can't tell you
- How effective any arrangement is at stopping or solving crime. The figures are counts of processes, not outcomes.
- Sovereignty, regulatory autonomy and other non-economic factors people weigh in these arrangements.
- Whether defence spending meets a particular need. A share of GDP is an input, not a measure of capability.